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INTRODUCTION
In an article published in this journal, C.O. Akpan argues that it is “unnatural for a man to sleep with a
man as with a woman, and the idea of marriage in this sense is an abomination” (2017, p. 9). Arguments
in favour of same sex marriage, he claims, are “driven and motivated by the human right fad through
which same-sex couples feel they have [an] ‘inalienable right’ over their bodies and regarding who to
marry…” (Akpan, 2017, p. 9). However, this alleged right is a “misrepresentation of what was originally
intended,” and is therefore “a sort of elixir forced on people to accept same-sex marriage as a
fundamental right. This is a consequent of [Western] culture’s anomie and cannot be made a global
phenomenon” (Akpan, 2017, p. 9). In particular, he thinks that same-sex marriage (and homosexuality) is
(are) inappropriate for African countries such as Nigeria where he lives and works.
Africans have a legitimate concern about any imposition of ‘Western values’ on Africa. As Marc
Epprecht (2013; 2008) has noted, the colonialism of Europe and the Americas has had some
tremendously negative effects on Africa, including the western world’s cultural and moral imperialism. It
is important, therefore, to include African voices in a discussion of homosexuality and same-sex marriage
in our discussion, which we do here. Having said that, however, flawed arguments remain flawed
regardless of their author, and, we argue, Akpan’s arguments are deeply flawed. To begin, he
misrepresents both ‘Western’ and ‘African’ views as homogeneous and ‘real African’ positions as
somehow removed from any outside influences, whether that be from the West, the Middle East or
elsewhere. ‘Western’ and ‘African’ thought is heterogeneous and fluid on a few issues including
homosexuality and same-sex marriage. Hence, we begin our argument in Section 2 by setting the context
with a brief discussion of Africa (including its diversity), both historically and at present. Another function
of this section is to demonstrate that human rights are neither a “fad” nor something about which only
‘Westerners’ are interested.
Despite Akpan’s view on the immorality of homosexuality, his arguments in opposition to them
clearly emanate from the Abrahamic religious tradition, which is an import to Africa. Moreover, though
he formally rejects two widely employed anti-LGBTQ+ arguments as flawed -- the so-called
unnaturalness argument and the argument from religion – his acceptance of the complementarity
argument is a close relation, and in fact is based upon both these positions. Thus, as we shall see in detail
in Section 3, Akpan’s anti- LGBTQ+ and anti same-sex marriage position is inadequately defended and
should be rejected.
In Section 3, we also consider Akpan’s claims that the ‘West’ suffers from a cultural anomie that
they attempt to force upon the rest of the world. Here, we show the ways in which Akpan misrepresents
Western culture and the place of human rights within it, as well as the meaning of “anomie.” It is not that
the West suffers from a lack of cultural norms, which is what is typically meant by anomie. Far from it:
the nations of the West have cultural and moral norms, but these nations are heterogeneous, not
homogeneous. One need only consider the social, political, and moral divide between two opposing
camps within contemporary America to see the truth of this claim. To protect itself against the chaos
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that such divisions can cause within a nation state, we must allow many groups of people (and individuals)
to follow different paths to achieve what they perceive as the good for them as well as a conception of
the public good. Hence, liberal democracies that respect both majorities, via public voting, and
minorities, via constitutions and charters of rights and freedoms, aim to allow different groups within a
nation state to co-exist peacefully. 1 They do this in large part by allowing their citizens, either individually
or in combination, freedom in many areas, such as religion, expression, and association. These freedoms
are allowed so long as doing so does not “harm” others, in the requisite sense of that term. Concomitant
with these freedoms are rights that prohibit discrimination based on such things as race, sex, and religion.
Finally, in Section 4 we turn to consider the situation in South Africa, the only African nation to
enshrine LGBTQ+ rights within its constitution. This consideration is fundamentally important. Though
we believe we have shown the weaknesses of Akpan’s (and others’) anti-LGBTQ+ arguments, the real
test of LGBTQ+ recognition comes from the ground, so to speak, i.e., how has this recognition altered
the everyday situation of real people living real lives. By starting with a decision to leave behind the moral
arguments on LGBTQ+, South Africa decided upon a political and legal course of action. In this section,
we show the benefits, in terms of health especially, of a legal recognition of LGBTQ+ rights concomitant
with a political obligation to adhere to such rights.

THE AFRICAN CONTEXT
In providing a proper context for discussing sexual rights in Africa, we define sexual rights as part of the
broader definition of human rights, and we also show how the history of human rights in Africa is part of
the overall global history of human rights. One of the problems with Akpan’s discussion of rights is he
does neither of these things, opting instead to (erroneously) dismiss rights as a Western “fad.”
Sexual rights are most appropriately considered as human rights in general. While there is no
consensus on the precise definition of sexual rights, the working definition of the World Health
Organization (WHO) states, "Sexual rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in
international and regional human rights treaties, supported in consensus documents and found in
national laws” (WHO, 2010). It then outlines fundamental rights that are essential to the full realization
of sexual health. Sexual rights, then, are based on applying existing fundamental human rights to sexual
health and sexuality in the context of protection against discrimination. The specific rights include the
rights to life, liberty, autonomy and security of the person, the right to be free from torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to privacy and the rights to information and
education. Others include the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to an effective
remedy for violations of their fundamental rights. To assert, as Akpan does, that rights are a foreign,
Western infiltration into Africa, indirectly also asserts that all the rights referred to in this paragraph are
alien to Africa. This seems implausible.
The context in which Akpan's paper is set is the historical evolution of human rights in general in
a highly diverse and changing Africa. Without subscribing to the "radical break" theory, which asserts
there were human rights protections in pre-colonial African communities, or to claims that there is a ‘hard
split’ between the colonial and post-colonial periods, for heuristic purposes we consider three phases of
underlying conditions relevant to people’s rights. These are the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial
phases of African human rights developments.

1 The reason

the US appears on the brink of chaos at the moment is a complex issue beyond the scope of this paper. One could
argue, however, that a disrespect for the rule of law (like the appropriate separation between various branches of
government), a failure to respect the point of views of others, the failure to protect minorities, and a turn to demagoguery are
all part of America’s current problems. Interestingly, this is a problem that we have seen in far too many nations within Africa
as we discuss below.
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Pre-Colonial Phase
In the pre-colonial phase, Africa was dominated by traditional societies organized around more than
3,000 ethnic groups, featuring equally diverse languages and cultures. This background highlights the
historic nature of the massive heterogeneity that makes it difficult to avoid Africa's astonishing diversity
by trying to tell a single story, good intentions for an emancipatory Pan Africa notwithstanding. It also
defies efforts to put a simple label to ideas as being 'un-African', as we have indicated regarding human
rights.
In discussions of African human rights regimes of these earliest periods, one contentious issue
has been whether there were human rights protections or merely a defense of human dignity in
traditional societies. One idea regarding the beginning of human rights is that it began in ancient Europe:
in, for example, the ancient philosophy, religion, and mythology of Greece. Another view similarly thinks
the origin of human rights is European (and North American) but temporally places that beginning in the
modern period, culminating in the UN human rights declaration of 1948.
If we accept that human rights originally stem from Europe, the claim by some scholars who
uncover “African” forms of rights in the pre-colonial past confuse human dignity for human rights (Tibi,
1990) (Howard, 1990). While they acknowledge that fully developed notions of human dignity existed in
societies outside Western cultures and contexts, the notion of human rights as enforceable against the
state only came from the later articulation of entitlements in law. They argue that protections of human
dignity alone do not generate human rights. Rhoda Howard, for instance, claims that the focus in
traditional Africa was only on the inner moral nature and worth of the human person: "There is no
specifically African concept of human rights. The argument for such a concept is based on a philosophical
confusion of human dignity with human rights, and on an inadequate understanding of structural
organization and social change in African society" (Howard, 1990, p. 23).
Other writers arrive at the same conclusion by using the distinction between human rights and
distributive justice (Connelly, 1982). The central argument in this case is that giving people their
entitlements as rights is different from having rights that accrue from the fact that one is a human being.
In this view, rights assigned in traditional African societies according to one's communal membership,
recognized achievements, family position or status do not qualify as human rights.
However, if we recognize and appreciate competing narratives about the meaning, practice, and
history of human rights around the world including Africa itself, it makes sense to avoid the fixity of a
single calcified meaning of human rights, as a recent legal 'gift' from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948. Obviously, essentialist legal scholars and legal positivists will disagree but the risk of being
a-historical cannot be ignored. Downplaying the historical context partly accounts for this focus on
change while neglecting the vital underlying continuities that provide the progression towards a more
inclusive human right. As Ugor puts it:
Human Rights may have been codified and legally backed in 1948, but the philosophy and
practices that it implies are traceable to different societies across the world and Africa ...
At the very core of the idea of human rights is the concern with how individuals and groups
interact within society. This implies that the most fundamental unit of social life is neither
solely the individual nor the group, but rather the association between the two (Ugor,
2018, p. 368).
In this regard, the following remarks by Wole Soyinka, commenting on the practice in Northern Nigeria
of stoning women to death, are important:
We can anticipate that some will claim that the religious laws under which such barbarity
is justified predate the laws of the entity called Nigeria - and do note that I pronounce it a
barbarity on the authority, not of the Western or Christian world, but on that of preexistent codes of social regulations evolved in several of those constituent nations, the
Yoruba among them, whose adjudicating systems, the balance of ethical norms,
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infringement and restitution boast a longer ancestry than those of either of the imported
religions of this nation - Christianity and Islam” (Soyinka, 2008, p. 47).
The other contextual backdrop to the evolution of human rights in Africa is the experience of
widespread slavery. For four hundred years Africans were on the run from the monstrosity and raw terror
of slave raids. As some have pointed out, what is stunning is that we even have a culture to speak of after
such a harrowing historic episode. Apart from the immediate destruction that transpired, we will return
to long-term consequences of slavery in discussing human rights in the post-colonial period.
The anti-slavery and emancipation struggles were part of the slow but sure progress towards
fundamental freedoms and human rights. These struggles are relevant in thinking about human rights
and inspiring in the quest for a more inclusive human rights regime in Africa today.
The Colonial Period
The historical link between the independence struggles in Africa and human rights is sometimes
dismissed because anti-colonialism movements sought popular liberation and were not focused on
limiting state power. However, as Bonny Ibhawoh has argued,
anti-colonialism did not develop in isolation of the universal human rights discourse. It was
integral to the development and vernacularization of the post-war universal human rights
ideal. By vernacularization, I mean the complex process by which external impulses were
appropriated into local ideas and situations to produce hybridized understandings of human
rights (Ibhawoh, 2014).
Generally, African states and their perspectives on decolonization and anti-colonialism were important
to the history and emergence of the United Nations and its human rights agenda/legislation. The
relationship between human rights and anti-colonialism though was not unidirectional. During the
debates, the so-called colonial powers put up unprincipled defenses of colonization, pretending that lack
of self determination had nothing to do with universal fundamental human rights.
The Post- Colonial Period
Post-colonial Africa is made up of 54 countries on the continent as well as six island states. Sometimes,
a distinction is drawn between northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, which excludes Morocco, Algeria,
Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. The total population of the continent is just over 1.2 billion. There are six
different colonial legacies including British, French, Portuguese and German and more than 12
agroecological zones (Todd J Moss, 2018) .
At the beginning of 1990, out of the 54 African countries, 49 were dictatorships of the military or
‘civilian’ type. The citizens had practically no substantive role in determining public policy because of low
levels of political competition and participation. Leadership turnover was rare. Between the
independence years in early 1950s and 1990, no African government had changed leadership by way of
peaceful electoral defeat, the majority having been ejected by uniformed gunmen. The exceptions were
Ahijdo of Cameroon, Senghor of Senegal, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. During the 2000s, almost all
states carried out both economic and political reforms. The results are mixed. Some countries did
relatively well. These include South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya, Botswana, Ghana, Cote d Ivoire, Benin,
Ethiopia, and Senegal. Others fell behind including Malawi, Eritrea, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Central
African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, and Togo. Zimbabwe stands on its own with an imploded economy
and a military government.
As a region, the profile of human rights in Africa has evolved and made the following
achievements:
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1. African states (especially frontline states as we used to call them) actively supported South Africa
in removing the apartheid system. Here it must be emphasized that the struggle in South Africa
was against minority rule, not against a section of South African society.
2. The rise of the public profile of human rights since the adoption of the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights in 1981, subsequently ratified by the African Union.
3. The incorporation by some African states of human rights provisions or bills of rights in their
constitutions.
4. The establishment by some African states of national institutions and mechanisms; for example,
national human rights commissions, including Uganda, to promote and protect human rights.
5. An expansion of the normative and institutional architecture of the regional human rights
system.
6. The signing of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child.
7. The establishment of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the African
Child.
8. The adoption by the African Union in 2003 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights of Women in Africa.
9. The African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.
10. More involvement and contributions to human rights work by individuals, including scholars,
lawyers, and advocates.
All these accomplishments indicate that, contrary to what Akpan maintains, there has been a great
interest in pushing for human rights within Africa by Africans.
Having said that, it is also undeniable that the continent has experienced some setbacks or
limitations. The regional human rights achievements mentioned above have tended to be exclusionary
to certain groups, especially the LGBTQ+ community. The only African nation to include LGBTQ+ rights
is South Africa, which we discuss in some detail in Section 4. The problem with the other African states
is that they have yet to bring the internationally recognized rights of non-discrimination to LGBTQ+
citizens of their countries. This remains the case even when most of those states specify nondiscrimination in their constitutions.
The second setback is the criminalizing of homosexuality. There has been a wave in opposition
to bringing sexual rights under the umbrella of human rights more generally, and of repealing laws or at
least lessening the severity of ‘sexual crimes. For example, in 1990, Uganda extended punishment for
‘carnal knowledge against the order of nature’ from a 14-year jail term to life imprisonment. In 2005, a
constitutional amendment was passed prohibiting same-sex marriages. This sort of re-criminalization
was repeated in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Rwanda, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia,
Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, and the Gambia. Among these, only Rwanda dropped plans to criminalize
same sex relations. This stands in stark contrast to the 1990s where there were no arrests related to same
sex relations in most African states and homosexuality was mostly not on anyone’s political agenda.
Lastly, while instruments are now available de jure, the protection of human rights faces a
multiplicity of challenges, led by the administrative capacity issues of the states. e.g., turmoil in Northern
Uganda and Northern Nigeria.
Sadly, a major factor in the repeated pattern of making gains followed by setbacks is related to
the slave history of Africa. Evidence of a causal link from slave raids to mistrust in modern day Africa is
documented by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). They show that current differences in trust levels within
Africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. They combined
contemporary individual-level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group and
found that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today.
They show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual,
such as cultural norms, beliefs, and values. Here it is mistrust for family members, relatives, other
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individuals, clients, and governments at any level. This is an important factor in the real lived contexts of
Africa for any reform and development effort in the post-colonial period. A key ingredient in reforms and
development is cooperation. This is so critical that it is advanced as one of the reasons for the dominance
of the humans as a species. It is far more difficult to get cooperation where there is underlying mistrust.
One way forward, even within this context of mistrust, may come from viewing human, and thus
sexual minority rights, in a holistic manner. Zeleza (Zeleza & McConnaughay, 2004) argues that the
construction of human rights norms is a dynamic and continuous process which is foreclosed neither by
exclusivist claims of an envisaged western progeny and universality nor an equally make-believe African
or Asian cultural singularity and relativity. The plea for a holistic view of human rights is captured well in
his introduction:
Thus, neither the North nor the South, the developed nor the developing worlds can claim
to be on the side of angels where human rights are concerned. Yet, ethnocentrism continues
in human rights discourse about conceptualization, constitution, and contextualization of
human rights. A more holistic global regime of human rights would have to encompass all
the so-called three generation of [rights]. The growing list of rights [is] itself a reflection of
the emergence of an increasingly universal human rights regime as more and more societies
and social constituencies, hitherto excluded from human rights claims, make their demands
for inclusion.
Having set the context of rights in Africa, let us turn to the specific argument made by Akpan against
same sex marriage and homosexuality.

AKPAN’S ARGUMENT
We note first that though Akpan claims his argument focuses on the moral illegitimacy of same-sex
marriage, his arguments against same-sex marriage 2 depend on and are often conflated with his claim
that homosexuality is immoral. This dependence comes out clearly when he says that “’[s]ame-sex
marriage’ evokes questions pertaining to sexual morality” (Akpan, 2017, p. 4).
In considering the morality of homosexuality, Akpan considers but rejects (he claims) two
arguments often used by those who are anti-LGBTQ+: the unnaturalness argument and the argument
from religion. Yet, his support of the anti LGBTQ+ ‘complementarity’ argument relies upon these two
arguments. So, a very brief discussion of these two ‘rejected’ arguments is in order.
The religious argument against homosexuality notes that in sacred scripture in all three
Abrahamic religions -- Judaism, Christianity, and Islam --, homosexuality is considered immoral. In
Judaism and Christianity, the most often cited scripture is Leviticus 18:22 “you must not have intercourse
with man as you would with woman; it is abomination.” Muslims often refer to the story of the prophet
Lot telling his people: “Will you commit lewdness such as no people in creation have committed before
you? For you come in lust to men in preference to women. No, you are indeed a people transgressing
beyond bounds (Qur’an:7:80-81). As Akpan points out, these arguments must be rejected because very
few Christians, Jews, and Muslims interpret sacred scripture so literally, or follow all the laws as they are
stipulated therein. (Akpan, 2017, pp. 5-6). So, not following strict rules against homosexuality may be no

Akpan actually distinguishes between two forms of same-sex marriage. One of these forms occurs when the marriage
partners of the same sex engage in sex together, or are at least intimate in some sexual way. This is the type of same sex
marriage familiar not only in the West but around the world. It is also the form of same sex marriage that we will discuss in this
paper. The other form of same-sex marriage Akpan discusses is practiced in parts of Africa where a married woman marries
another woman. Here, though, the two women do not have sex together. Rather, they get married because, allegedly, the
initial wife can’t conceive or can’t bear children. The second wife is brought into the marriage to allow for procreation by
having sex with the husband. For all intents and purposes, this second type of marriage is really a form of heterosexual
polygyny. Akpan rejects this form of same-sex marriage as well – on the basis that it is a form of adultery. Since this practice
has nothing to do with same-sex marriage as it is commonly conceived, we do not discuss it further.

2
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odder than not following Biblical injunctions against eating sheep’s fat (Leviticus 7:23) or the requirement
that we condemn to death children who curse their parents (Leviticus 20:9: Akpan, pp. 5-6).
The unnaturalness argument moves from the claims that homosexuality in unnatural and that all
unnatural things or behaviours are immoral to the conclusion that homosexuality must be immoral. The
problem here, which is well documented in the literature (e.g., Leiser, 1997), is that there is no way to
define unnatural consistently, and without equivocation, that makes the statements that ‘homosexuality
is unnatural’ and that ‘all unnatural things/acts/behaviour are immoral’ both true. Consider, for example,
when we define unnatural as uncommon (or statistically abnormal). Here, it becomes clear that though
homosexuality is statistically uncommon, it is also quite clear that not all uncommon things are immoral,
e.g., being 7 ft. tall, being a university professor, having red hair, etc. The most used definition of
unnatural for use in this argument is dysteleological, i.e., something used in a way that is inconsistent
with its purpose. Akpan rejects this form of the argument by noting it is too broad since it would make
immoral several things that we typically don’t consider so, such as sexual intercourse while using
“artificial” forms of birth control, or sex between infertile people, such as women who have passed
menopause, or men whose sperm is impotent (Akpan, 2017, p. 5).
But there are other problems with this argument that should be noted because Akpan uses them
in his defence of the complementarity argument. Teleology has historically connoted a God created
universe where everything (and their parts) has a designed purpose. This view is popular within religion
but has been rejected by science since the Renaissance when scientists like Galileo worked to separate
scientific investigation from religious ones. Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection is
particularly clear on this point. Speciation is not the result of purpose/telos designed by an omnipotent
being, but by purely mechanical, earthly forces. Evolution is simply far too ‘messy’ to be the product of
omnipotent design, a fact brought out by the fact that approximately 99% of the species that have ever
existed on our planet are now extinct (See, e.g., Fuller, 2014). As we shall see below when we discuss the
complementarity argument, organisms and their parts have functions, but not teloi. The difference
between the two is important. Function does not imply creation (other than biological reproduction), and
especially not designed creation. Moreover, function has no implication for morality. That is, there is no
connotation that using a thing in a non-functional way is immoral, even if using a thing dysteleologically
is often associated with immorality (though we dispute that claim below as well).
The complementarity argument seems related to the teleological argument (which itself is, as
we have said, often part of a religious viewpoint) but is a little different. It is based on the perception of
a ‘fit’ of some sort between the male and female bodies that is absent in male-male and female-female
combinations. Somehow, only man-woman sexual activity is complementary; same sex coupling is not.
As Akpan says, if we “take a very objective and deep look at the human structure, physique, and
physiology,” we will see how heterosexual sex is complementary, while homosexual sex is not” (Akpan,
2017, p.5).
But what is it exactly that becomes “clear” with this “objective and deep look?” Is it that a penis
‘fits’ in a vagina in a way that a penis does not fit in an anus or mouth, or other parts of the human body?
Or that there is no penetration in lesbian sex at all (qua their genitalia)? But what does this mean exactly?
In one sense, for example, penises do fit into anuses (and other parts of human anatomy) just as they fit
into vaginas, as evidenced by the fact that all sorts of people – both gay and straight – engage in such
sexual interaction. So, it can not be just the possibility of penetration that is at issue here. What else,
then, could it be? Several people who employ this complementarity argument suggest that it is
reproduction. Hence, though a penis might fit into both an anus and a vagina, it is only through penisvaginal intercourse that reproduction is possible (leaving aside for the moment, artificial forms of
insemination). As we have noted above, however, Akpan himself rejects the teleological/natural
argument against homosexuality. So, again, we are left to wonder what point(s) Akpan is making here.
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The passage below is Akpan’s longest explanation of the complementarity argument regarding same
sex sexual interaction.
Same-sex marriage is simply bestial: it is a slap on human sensibility and sickly. If a male
goat, or dog or any other animal for that matter does not mate with their kind, why should
man stoop that low to even think of marrying another man? If man is part of nature, and a
natural and biological being for that matter, he should know that nature as it had structured
the physique of man and woman in a way that every part has its function and should be used
for that function. Or do we use our legs to fly, or our hands to walk or our ears to swallow
food? Assuming we use any part of our body for non-specific function, we should know that
such is tangential, and not natural. Assuming we see a man develop wings and fly or a man
with full fleshed and milk-filled breast for example, would we not say such are unnatural
phenomena? Physiologists and medical doctors would claim that such phenomena are
sickly and abnormal, and not natural: for it is not in the nature of man to fly nor develop full
fleshed and milk-filled breast. As such they would look for ways to rectify the abnormality.
In this sense, does it not occur to homosexuals and supporters that such activity where a
male sleeps with another male as with a woman is sickening, abnormal and therefore
obscene, indecent, and immoral (Akpan, pp. 7-8)?
Akpan seems to make three (related) points here.
1. Other animal species do not engage is homosexual sex. A male goat or dog does not “mate”
with another male goat or dog.
2. Humans are a biological part of nature and indeed survive only through sexual reproduction.
Nature has structured their bodies – differently for males and females – for exactly this
reproductive purpose.
3. It is unnatural for a human to fly or a man to have milk filled breasts. If a human were to try to
fly or a man to breast feed his baby, this would be abnormal or uncommon, and “therefore
obscene, indecent, and immoral.”
Let’s consider these points individually. The first point is quite simply false. Same-sex coupling occurs
in a great many and wide variety of species, as does ‘incest’, ‘rape’, ‘courtship’, ‘same-sex animal pairs’,
and so on (Ruse, 1995). Hence, same-sex sexual activity is a widespread ‘natural’ phenomenon. This
isn’t to say that we think this is particularly meaningful because we believe that human sexuality is
quite different in significant ways than non-human animal sexuality, and hence the later ought not to
be taken as a model for the former. We mention the wide spread of same-sex coupling throughout
the animal kingdom only as it pertains to this unnaturalness and complementarity argument against
homosexuality.
The second point is partially true, but in a way that has no or only limited relevance to Akpan’s
conclusions. Humans are indeed biological beings, and they reproduce sexually, not asexually as some
species do. Moreover, Akpan is correct that gays and lesbians cannot reproduce, at least qua gay and
lesbian sex. So, clearly at least some humans must reproduce through sexual reproduction involving
opposite sex intercourse. But given that heterosexuals constitute most people, there is surely no
danger in humans becoming extinct because 2-5% of the population are not heterosexual. One could
add as well that it is surely not immoral for individuals, gay or straight, not to reproduce. Indeed, some
might argue that with a world population of almost 8 billion, and growing exponentially, it would be
a benefit to humanity that some people do not reproduce. 3
3 This is a sort of modern day rendition of the argument made by some sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists to
explain the persistence of homosexuality across thousands of generations given that they do not reproduce. Though we do not
necessarily endorse or agree with sociobiology and its materialistic reductionism, one of their arguments here is that there
must be some sort of evolutionary advantage to communities having some homosexuals vs. communities that are completely
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The third point is more complicated since it involves the controversial notion of a teleological,
God created universe. We have already addressed parts of this argument above by pointing out that
such a view is anathema to contemporary science, and that “function” is different than “telos.” So,
organs have functions. And clearly the (or a) function of the male and female reproductive organs is
reproduction. Even granting this, Akpan’s claims about homosexuality and same-sex marriage still do
not hold. First, some organs, like the penis, have at least two functions – urination and sexual
intercourse. Does one take precedence over the other, making one of its uses immoral? If they are
both legitimate functions of this organ, then why can’t organs in general and this one have more than
one or two functions? Perhaps intercourse, or sexual activity more generally, functions as a way in
which to express care and love, or as a way in which to have, under certain conditions, harmless,
though often deeply meaningful, consensual pleasure?
Consider in this context, the ‘function’ or ‘telos’ of the female clitoris. Clearly, it functions as a
way in which women can achieve an orgasm. Indeed, according to some recent research, only 18% of
women say they can achieve an orgasm by penetrative sex alone (Herbinick et al., 2018). That is, most
women need direct clitoral stimulation to achieve an orgasm which often does not happen through
penis-vagina intercourse alone. Is that, then, the function of the clitoris? This possibility becomes even
more intriguing given that several researchers, perhaps Elisabeth Lloyd (2006) most prominently,
have argued that the clitoris has no biological, reproductive function! That is, whether a female
experiences an orgasm has no impact and hence no purely biological function for human
reproduction. Is women’s sexual pleasure, then, the function of this organ? Is it immoral not to employ
the clitoris, for example, through digital or oral stimulation, so this organ can fulfill its function?
Finally, why does Akpan think that a dysteleological use of an organ makes such a use immoral
– indeed “sickening” according to Akpan? I use my nose and my ears to hold up my glasses? Is this
immoral since I am using the organs dysteleologically? One might note here that such uses of my
nose and ears are incidental only. But this response is inadequate. Even if we agree that nonreproductive sex, whether straight or gay, is an incidental use of our sexual organs, we can still ask
why such incidental use, in and of itself, makes such use immoral.
Having dealt with the issue about the morality of homosexuality, let’s turn specifically to the matter
of same-sex marriage. On this subject, Akpan considers, but ultimately rejects, arguments based on
tradition. He phrases this argument as follows: [T]raditionally, marriage is a sacred union that unites
man and woman together for life, and any union having to do with sexual relations, but which is
contrary to the sacred institution is immoral; and would change a generally acceptable tradition”
(Akpan, 2017, p. 6). Supporters of same-sex marriage respond to this argument from tradition by
claiming, as Akpan notes, that tradition does not justify an action (Akpan, 2017, p. 6). Most
states/cultures have at some time condoned slavery. But that does not make such a practice morally
acceptable no matter how long that practice has been part of that state or culture’s tradition.
Finally, Akpan considers rights-based arguments that defend the moral legitimacy of
(homosexuality and) same-sex marriage. Oddly, in our view, Akpan at this point gets into a technical
issue regarding whether the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)and the
Human Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) include same-sex marriage rights under their ‘right to
marry’ articles. We are uncertain why Akpan refers at this point to these documents instead of to
general claims made by same-sex marriage supporters of human rights in general. Perhaps putting
forth interpretive questions on these human rights documents somehow weakens the force of these

heterosexual. Some suggestions have been that a slightly smaller community population runs less risk of running out of food.
Or that having childless gays and lesbians in a community helps with raising the children of heterosexuals. (See, e.g., Ruse,
1995).
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documents as they apply to nations such as Nigeria. But Nigeria is a signatory on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (See UN, 1996).
As we have discussed in Section 1, human rights have a long history. While the ‘West’ has perhaps
been at the forefront of promoting and extending human rights over the past two centuries especially, a
concern for and recognition of human rights has become an increasingly global phenomenon, including
Africa. Indeed, as we have noted, the recognition of some human rights in Africa has proven to be a
successful tool in decolonizing Africa. In the next section, we turn to a consideration of how South Africa
has employed legal rights for sexual minorities to improve both the lives of the LGBTQ+ community and
improved public health for everyone. Before turning to that material, however, it is important to note
that people in the ‘West’ are not all pro- LGBTQ+ rights and in favour of same-sex marriage (See, e.g.,
Gallagher’s arguments in Corvino and Gallagher, 2012; Shrage and Stewart, 2015). It is a mistake, then,
for Akpan to treat the ‘West’ as a single homogeneous viewpoint. Indeed, liberal democracies are
favoured for the very reason that they offer the hope of peaceful differences of opinion and toleration
about important issues. Furthermore, not all ‘Western’ arguments supporting LGBTQ+ concerns and
same-sex marriage are rights based. Many are consequentialist. That is, the arguments employed point
to the positive consequences respecting the concerns of people not only in the LGBTQ+ community but
also society at large. Consider, in this context, the following argument by John Corvino in support of what
he calls “marriage equality:”
It is good for human beings to commit to someone else to have and to hold, for better or
worse, and so on, for life. It is good regardless of whether you happen to be straight or gay. It
is good, not only for them, but also for their neighbors, because happy, stable couples make
happy, stable citizens. And marriage helps sustain this like nothing else. (Corvino and
Gallagher, 2012, p. 180).

THE IMPORTANCE OF SEXUAL MINORITY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
With regards to constitutional, legislative, or public policy formalizations, states could reasonably
consider grounding these in human rights principles that govern the collective, regardless of what
individuals might choose at any given moment for themselves within that collective. In its
constitutional era, South Africa has turned towards this approach concerning same-sex sexual
practice or marriage and family, specifically, and broader legislative or policy reform, generally.
Although not stated as such, this approach implies a distinction between what Habermas (1993)
termed ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ reasoning – a distinction which Akpan (2017) does not accommodate in
his arguments. On one hand, the matter of an individual’s (or group’s) life choices, is a question for
personal (or group) ethical deliberation. What is good for “me” or “us” rests on the same internal logic.
On the other hand, whether sexual practice or marriage, in general, can be followed as a maxim, is a
moral question which connects to a principle of universalizability, that is, is it a right that should be
open to all in relevantly similar circumstances, whether they choose it or not? The latter directly
affects the collective. With this important distinction, sexual practice and/or marriage is equally open
to consenting adults who choose such undertakings for themselves and their consenting partners. No
one is compelled to do so. The individual/pair/group formations of these interactions, be they
heterosexual or LGBTQ+ or otherwise, should be insignificant. Consequently, for all consenting or
concerned parties, whether they may find themselves in states in the West or Africa or anywhere else,
if marriage and sexual rights are recognized as a general good as Corvino (2012) suggests above, then
these rights should ideally be accessible to all and equally applied.
South Africa’s pre-constitutional state was rooted in a narrow, religious, conservative morality
that was oppressive towards sexual minorities with legislation being somewhat disconnected from the
reality of the social collective. Linking to this problem, Rubin explains that there exists an ordering of
sexuality and sexual practice in culture that authorizes “good, natural, normal sex” as “heterosexual,
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marital, monogamous, reproductive, and non-commercial” (Rubin, 1984, p. 152). Rubin exposes a rather
palpable, yet constructed, connection between heteronormativity and morality in social interaction.
However, not only is this connection constructed, but it comes with numerous value attachments. Value
framings, along with simple regularity of occurrence and visibility, has allowed heteronormative
attitudes to shape socially acceptable sexual practice by portraying heterosexuality as ‘natural’ or
‘normal’ and these loaded concepts, in turn, further constrain and reproduce social phenomena within a
feedback loop. Nevertheless, what is common or repeated, may not necessarily be ‘natural’ or ‘normal’
and none of these concepts necessarily implies notions of normativity or what should be. Logically
speaking, these entailments might be arbitrary but the unquestioned leaps between natural-normalnormative concepts quickly consolidate to form the basis of moral judgments which often fix the basis
for legislation and other formalizations.
The sex or sexuality continuum is vast and varied (Fausto-Sterling 2000). Therefore, the norms
that govern human sexual or marriage interaction would have to be broader and more nuanced. As
Gagnon rightly asserts, “there are many ways to become, to be, to act, to feel sexual” (Gagnon 1977,
Preface). To serve an end of justice, as states are obligated to do, formalizations must be able to
accommodate variations on the sexuality continuum. Accordingly, in the South African Constitution
(1996), marriage and sexual rights would be granted regardless of personal biographical configurations
which are specifically listed as: “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin,
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth”
(Equality Clause, South African Constitution, 1996). The establishment of the Constitution paved the way
for the removal of criminalization legislation aimed at LGBTQ+ individuals or communities and allowed
for full legal recognition of same sex marriage (and adoption) in 2006.
Human rights resolutions and frameworks, in their current form, were preceded by enormous
costs in terms of widespread pain, marginalization and loss of human life during global conflict which
was not limited to populations of the “West.” With a precursory acknowledgement of world history,
it would be inaccurate to characterize human rights as a “fad” as Akpan does (Akpan, 2017, p. 1).
Human rights are hard-fought-for highly contested victories. Similarly, in the South African context,
specifically, the country emerged from long, arduous struggles against forms of tribal conflict,
colonization, and segregation (apartheid), to become a free, equal, democratic society. During South
Africa’s well-documented, pre-constitutional era, both as groups and individually, LGBTQ+
individuals were habitually categorized as criminals and often bore the brunt of state-sanctioned
punishment, harassment, force, and violence. LGBTQ+ individuals were routinely rebuffed in society,
being variously characterized as sinners, or pariahs, as well as pathologized as sexual deviants or
perverts. Just like other countries, neither disenfranchisement nor sociocultural attacks erased
LGBTQ+ individuals from South African society but it did marginalize them or drive them
underground. Furthermore, because apartheid was an explicitly racist system, and deeply connected
to a particularly conservative brand of Christianity, these exclusions and marginalization were
“experienced more intensely by those South Africans already suffering under the yoke of apartheid
because of their race, sex and economic status.” (de Ru, 2013). To be sure, not all sexual liberation
activism was inclusive of all races (Frühstück 2014, p. 44).
The first election with universal suffrage took place in 1994. Following the establishment of a
human rights-based Constitution in 1996, “South Africa thus became the first country in the world
explicitly to recognise in its Constitution that discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation would
automatically be unfair until proven otherwise” (de Ru 2013). However, the South African Constitution
does not only prohibit discrimination, but it also “places a duty on the state to ‘respect, protect,
promote, and fulfill’ the rights contained in the Bill of Rights” (Bilchitz 2015, p. 24). The expectation
that active measures be taken by the state with regards to social intervention and promotion of
equality, is a lesser known and less explored feature of human rights law. With the state taking up that
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mandate, research, recording, programming, and advocacy endeavours can now be supported. Public
policy and associated public health policy has expanded significantly to include LGBTQ+ health and
wellbeing. However, more work needs to be done.
Currently, South Africa is the only country in Africa to fully recognize same-sex marriage.
Regarding sexual practice, the rest of the continent’s positions range from states that do not enforce a
penalty for same-sex sexual practice (like Burkina Faso), to those which may invoke the death penalty
(like Somalia). That said, social and cultural interaction is typically slow to align itself with legislation.
Many LGBTQ+ South Africans continue to fight for freedom and acceptance in daily life. South Africa has
one of the worst records of gender-based violence, globally, which can be argued to be “rooted in unequal
power in gender relations, patriarchy, homophobia, sexism, amongst other harmful discriminatory
beliefs and practices” (South African Human Rights Commission, 2018, p. 4). Consequently, LGBTQ+
individuals remain some of the most vulnerable members of the population, suffering significant
minority stress with high incidents of self-harm and harm by others, including brutal hate crimes such as
“corrective rape” committed by men against lesbians (Frühstück 2014, p. 48).
In any society, the suppression of sexual rights has grave implications for public safety and,
consequently, public health. A healthy society implies a safe society. A significant benefit of recognizing
LGBTQ+ sexual practice and marriage or family, in terms of legislation and constitutional protection, is
that public health and supporting systems may take necessary measures to implement the appropriate
research, education, response, treatment and intervention openly and without stigma or castigation for
themselves and their patients. Decriminalization is not enough. More broadly, formal recognition paves
the way for a generalized approach of attentiveness, understanding, compassion and support results in
vastly improved public health interventions for many LGBTQ+ individuals, especially trans individuals
who have suffered significant rights violations in this sector (Gruskin et al., 2018). Furthermore, when
LGBTQ+ rights are fully recognized and accepted by the state, research, recording, programming, and
advocacy endeavours may be supported. These, in turn, can provide valuable, reliable, and publicly
accessible information. Access to information is vital for the implementation, monitoring, and protection
of human rights (South African Human Rights Commission 2018, pp. 16-17). Without impediment from
either legislation or social custom, the state’s initiatives to create and expand statistical databases can
be developed and utilized to screen and scrutinize all forms of discrimination and harm experienced by
LGBTQ+ individuals. This is essential to establishing strategies or policies for all public sectors that are
beneficial to all societal members regardless of individual gender or sexual identity.
South Africa, like many countries around the globe, has emerged from discriminatory pasts
and chosen formal approaches to rights. Patriarchal regulation of female sexuality as well as what
counts as legitimate sex is well documented (Stearns 2009, p. 17). The characterization of sexual rights
and freedoms as a Western intrusion or colonial interference is also well documented. (Stearns, 2009,
pp. 157, 158). South Africa continues to strive for equality and social reform under the same yokes.
However, progression towards realizing rights for all continues in the modern era because of
developments in global rights and standards that serve to minimize harm, especially with respect to
violence against women and sexual minorities and its repercussions for physical and mental health.
In closing, we would like to remind readers of a lesson that was, or at least should have been,
learned during the initial stages of the HIV/AIDS crisis. In the West, HIV/AIDS was initially thought to be
a disease caused by and contained within the male gay community. Hence, the first ‘formal’ name for
this disease was “gay-related immune deficiency,” or GRID, but was referred to informally as ‘the gay
plague’ (Wikipedia, ND). Because of its association with gay men and gay sex, followers of the “just world
hypothesis/fallacy,” HIV/AIDS was thought to be the just retribution for people engaging in immoral
sexual activity (Lerner and Montada, 1998). Hence, the evangelical minister and founder of the Moral
Majority, Jerry Falwell, infamously said in 1983 that “AIDS is not just God's punishment for homosexuals;
it is God's punishment for the society that tolerates homosexuals." (Cohen, ND). Moreover, in 1981,
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Ronald Reagan had just become President of the US in large measure from the support he received from
American evangelicals like Falwell, and so he was reticent to devote time or research money to the
disease. Reagan would address HIV/AIDS much later in his presidency at the Third International
Conference on AIDS in Washington. When he spoke, 36,058 Americans had been diagnosed with AIDS
and 20,849 had died. The disease had spread to 113 countries, with more than 50,000 cases” (White,
2004). The lesson here, surely, is that public health and safety ought not to become a political issue where
some groups of people are cast aside as unworthy of care. As we have pointed out, by recognizing legal
rights for those in the LGBTQ+ community, South Africa has made all its citizens safer and healthier. It is
time for more African nations to follow their lead.
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